Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the emulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.
Introduction
After regaining its independence, Lithuania had to build its armed forces and tradition of political-societal control of the military from scratch. By their nature armed forces might have be seen as a state within the state. Therefore, it does not matter what kind of political regime you are talking about, all of them are trying to put a leash on their military men. Democratic countries on this account are not an exception and have a long checklist: the defence minister must be a civilian; military men are forbidden to hold a public office and be elected, etc. As in other spheres, Lithuania borrowed and emulated ideas about civilian control from Western countries. During the 1990's a number of Western politicians, scholars, experts and military men visited Lithuania and provided much needed insights and advice. It is not surprising that because of that Lithuania successfully emulated Western institutional-judicial models of civil-military control. There exists a well-defined and clear legal system, which regulates activities, functions of armed forces ant their relations with civilian superiors. This civilian control is so routinized that a military coup d' état is difficult to imagine.
However, the lack of such ideas does not mean that Lithuanian civilmilitary relations are effective and productive. Western models emphasize the role and importance of political-legal institutions, while in many cases ignoring the content and quality of the politics implemented by these institutions. It is not enough to have well-functioning institutions and laws. Equally important is a proper understanding, and a perception of your profession, culture and tradition. In order to have all that you need to have proper intellectual reflection.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to look for the answers to these questions: how important for civil-military relations is reflective military thinking? What do the processes of this intellectual reflection look like? Are healthy, productive civil-military relations functions only based on an institutional, legislative, bureaucratic framework, or does it require more effort, particularly in the academic/reflective routine?
Military men, especially officers, must be able to reflect and think constantly about their profession. Otherwise, they might misjudge the complexity of war and be incapable of providing proper advice to their civilian superiors. Civilians, having less developed skills and knowledge on military issues, will not be able to assess the quality of advice given by the military. Under such conditions, wrong or incompetent political decisions could be made.
Revision of the Western Civil-Military Relations Model
French Prime Minister G. Clemenceau once said, "war is too important to be left to the generals" 1 . However, consider such questions: will future wars be like Iraq and Afghanistan? Alternatively, maybe they will be like the civil wars in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Or possibly like the Russian-Georgian and Russian-Ukrainian wars? From these questions follows another: is the search for the answers to these questions a privilege of civilians?
All these scenarios of future conflicts provide different visions of warfare, structures of armed forces, weapon systems and equipment, military training and education. Looking into the history and the lessons of contemporary conflicts it is clear that it is difficult or almost impossible to accommodate all these visions in preparing and training armed forces. Governments and militaries facing political and financial pressure will favour one or the other vision. In order to do that you need to reach a solution based on some kind of compromise. Yet, in order to have a successful strategy, civilians should treat the military as an equal partner in intellectual debate, not as subordinates. Proper and qualitative dialogue is imperative if you want to have critical reflection about all these questions. However, mainstream civil-military relations models are not very helpful and flexible for establishing such conditions.
In democratic countries, the attitude to these questions is as follows: it is not a soldier's job to ask questions about the use of military force in international politics. That privilege belongs to civilians only. The words of British Prime Minister D. Cameron during the Libyan campaign in 2011 illustrate this situation very well. Clearly irritated by the military's comments about the defence budget, Cameron was reported as saying "you do the fighting and I'll do the talking". 2 In other words, the British Prime minister reminded the British Defence chiefs that there is no place in politics for the military. This domain is exclusively civilian. A soldier's concern must be about the means and ways necessary to achieve civilians' goals. However, Cameron's rebuff was criticized, emphasizing that such tone will not promote productive and healthy civil-military relations. 3 In this case, we should ask ourselves what kind of civil-military relations we should have if we want to have a constructive dialog. P. Feaver elegantly captured the essence of civil-military relations: "because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection". 4 Proper civilian control is necessary in order to avoid the erosive effects of subjective civilian control 5 , which might lead to domination by the praetorian soldier 6 , who eventually will organize a coup d' état and replace his civilian superiors on the top of political system.
It was such fears, memories of a more distant and a more recent past and an unprecedented expansion of U.S. military after Second World War, which encouraged S. Huntington and M. Janowitz to write their magisterial books about civil-military relations.
7 Both scholars ask tough questions and provide partial answers. Huntington thought that, "the civil-military gap was an ideological divide between a generally conservative officer corps and a liberal and individualistic civilian society" 8 . For him the solution was to encourage the civilian side to move their virtues towards military ones. Janowitz thought differently-for him it was the military that has to make a move towards civilians. However, I would argue that by stating their normative positions their spent rest of the time in their books explaining and looking for specific institutional, political-bureaucratic solutions. Huntington did that in the form of historical case analysis. Janowtiz did so by analyzing different types of officers, role of technological management.
What is important is that all succeeding theories and models of civilianmilitary relations are based on the precepts of those two scholars. Basically, the next generations of scholars advanced and revised the analysis and ideas of these two scholars, which first of all was about the relationships between two groups of the elite: politicians and high ranking officers.
9 Two other influential scholars from this era, Amos Perlmuter and Samuel E. Finner, explicitly based their research on the political-military elite.
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When in post-Cold war era tensions between civilians and military in the U.S. increased, scholars in one way or another basically adjusted Huntington's/Janowitz's model or proposed their own on the premises of the same framework -elitist political decision making level. Rebeca's Schiff concordan- , were a continuation of this trend. All of these scholars in their works define power relations from a topdown perspective. The overall challenge of this academic endeavor was to find ways to check the military's advancements to the top decision making positions. Using the vocabulary of the famous sociologist M. Mann, all of them were talking about despotic power. According to him, this form of power is "the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups". 18 This power is over society, and people. Such power is concentrated in the center of the state apparatus. As an example of the expression of such form of power, there is the well-known idea of extraction-coercion cycle of state formation, proposed by Finer
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. However, Mann considered that despotic power alone was never enough for the state to control people and survive geopolitical competition. Therefore, alongside despotic power, polities exercised another form of control -infrastructural power. This form of power is "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decision throughout the realm". 20 So, if despotic power is over the people, then infrastructural power is through the people. Examples of infrastructural power are plenty: literacy, roads, taxation, postal system, standardization of measures, discipline, policing, mass conscription. In his magisterial 4-volume work on sources of social power, Mann shows that through history polities increase their infrastructural power by various means and ways. 21 What is important to stress is that these forms of power are not alternatives; rather they are complementary-two sides of the same coin. Such dual understanding of power, for instance, helps to explain Western democratic countries. These states with relatively small bureaucratic systems are despotically weak, but strong in infrastructural power sense, because of all its various forms and ways to control, and surveillance of the lives of their citizens.
This notion of infrastructural power in some way is not an original one. It is definitely affected by the ideas of M. Foucault 22 and bears resemblance to A. Gidden's "power container's" concept 23 . However, as will be shown in the following paragraphs, it was Mann's version which had found responsive audience and was accepted by the wider community of social scientists and historians. 
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American invention and civil-military relations theories and models are invented and tailored to solve American puzzles. Eventually these theories find a way and are adapted to analyze other states. You do not need to look far for examples: Huntington's and Janowitz's models, civil-military gap framework 25 or discussion about postmodern military are only the best known cases. 26 Therefore, a wider understanding and discussions about history and patterns of American social sciences are very important. Looking from the perspective of military sociology, an especially important issue is the question of the state.
In an influential article, J.P. Nettle wrote that "the relative "statelessness" of American social science coincides with the relative statelessness of the United States" 27 . For generations Americans thought that they were living in a country described by A. de Tocqueville in such words: "nothing is more striking to an European traveler in the United States than the absence of what we term the Government, or the Administration". 28 These words are essential. If we will measure and analyze the American state using the conceptual tools provided by continental Europeans like Tocqueville or M. Weber, then we would find a small government which eventually grew up, but not so much as its counterparts in Europe. Overall, there exists a myth of the weak American state and strong society. When reading articles and books about American state it is easy to note routinely used expressions like: exceptional, incomplete, backward, reluctant, etc. 29 However, the research of scholars working on the subject of American political development during the last three decades is forcing us to revise our assumptions. 30 Findings in this area reveal that America from the beginning "has been more powerful, capacious, tenacious, interventionist, and redistributive than was recognized in earlier accounts of U.S. history. " 31 This new trend provides new insights about many possible human activities and shows how the state has shaped all of them. Therefore, the puzzle is why this myth of a weak American state persists. One answer is provided by prominent American sociologist Andrew Abbott. According to him, in the field of American social sciences you still can see "the long, long shadow of Talcott Parsons, who for many decades persuaded Americans -and especially those who went to Harvard -that no theory was any good unless it was imported. " 32 Because of that, the revision of the weak American state myth is an invitation to move beyond M. Weber's definition of the state and stop concentrating only on bureaucracy and government. 33 That is where M. Mann's idea of two forms of power provides a solution which is taken by many of the scholars of this new school. It is worth quoting at some length from W. Novak, who gets precisely to the point:
The American state (like the American Revolution that produced it) is organized against despotic power. It is obsessive about separating and distributing powers and creating checks, balances, and offsets within the formal constitutional organization of government: federal vs. state vs. local; executive vs. legislative vs. judicial; popularly elected vs. appointed officials; short terms vs. life tenures; big states vs. small states; the creation of a fourth branch of government (administrative agencies) and an independent fourth estate (the press). It is no doubt this divided and dispersed organization of governance that most have when they talk too loosely about American anti-statism or statelessness.
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Into this long list of binaries we can easily include civil vs. military. It nicely fits into this framework of traditional American research. This is what I have in mind when talking about various theories and models of civil-military relations. The majority of them are developed for the American state mostly by Americans and all of them are concerned with checks and balances, restrictions, etc. Basically, both schools, Huntington's and Janowitz's, are concerned with institutional framework, questions of despotic power. It is important to emphasize that all these models, while remaining relevant, have limitations and cannot show the full reach of the state. 
Revision of Clausewitz's Ideas
Probably it would not be a surprise that the key author who binds all these questions is Carl von Clausewitz. In recent times, there was more than one attempt to dismiss him by saying that his ideas are outdated and irrelevant. 35 However, for many his ideas have not lost importance and are more important than ever. 36 The only question is what parts and ideas of his book are relevant for us today. The story of his book, its writing and publication is very well documented, and therefore does not require retelling. 37 However, the story of its interpretation and practical application sheds some light on the questions discussed in this paper. For Moltke the Elder and subsequent generations of German officers Clausewitz was important because of his practical and educational, not philosophical and theoretical, insights. 42 The later one after some time evolved into discussions about the centre of gravity. 43 The RMA debate focused on the question of friction and fog of war 44 , while proponents of the New Wars school concentrated on the question of the trinity and state-centered approach. 45 The fight against counterinsurgency brought back to a central place the discussion about relationships between war and politics 46 , while debates about cyberwar emphasize the question of force and violence. 47 The best way to approach Clausewitz's work is to search for answers to many questions by analyzing his two definitions of war: "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to our will" 48 and "War is not merely an act of policy but true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means". 49 The second one is a key to many answers and challenges. This definition puts politics/policy into a central position. This elevation of politics "distort[s] the intrinsic balance implied by the mere concept of the trinity itself ". 50 Looking from such perspective debate about what parts of his book Clausewitz wrote after his famous notes becomes essential. I disagree with Ch. Bassford's statement that A. Gat's "reconstruction […] is largely irrelevant". 51 If we take position of the Prussian general's new insights that he put into On War's book VIII we will have a very different view of the relationships between policy and war from the one expressed in Book I. That difference is essential. Do we see war as subservient to policy or do we see it as more dynamic and as reciprocal interaction?
The importance and legacy of Howard's and Paret's translation of the book is undeniable. It really made this work more accessible and readable. Appreciation of all of it, however, does not conceal the fact that the context of the Cold war left its mark on this translation. As H. Strachan pointed out, both scholars tended to "interpret Clausewitz's understanding of policy and politics according to their own liberal lights, and not according to his". 52 In this perspective, war is controlled by politics. It is a tool, an instrument in the hands of politicians. In some way it must not be surprising, keeping in mind the themes on which Paret and especially Howard worked. 53 Moreover, both these authors were typical scholars of their age. Strachan and others argue that the English translation of On War in 1976 created a perception of controllable war. The situation could be worse, considering the intellectual trends of that time.
If we survey post-1945 sociology, which has claimed for itself if not sole responsibility for the field of social, theory, it is striking how little it has been influenced by violence and war.
[…] a truly in-depth engagement with the problems of war, of the threat of war that might have driven theoretical developments is absent both from the oeuvre of Talcott In classical liberal theory, war is an evil, a deviation from the normal. It is an obstacle for humanity's progress and prosperity, especially when looking from the perspective of trade. In such interpretation, if you cannot avoid war, then at least you have to tame it, to control it. This intellectual tradition of social theory was influential long before the Cold war and nuclear weapons and remains dominant till now, 25 years after the collapse of Berlin wall. Looking from this perspective it is difficult to imagine two mainstream scholars from Anglo-Saxon states writing about war against the dominant intellectual tradition. In a liberal world, war has permission to exist only as an instrument, as a dependent variable. This understanding, despite virtually non-stop continuing warring around the world, still denies more a prominent role for war in people's lives and remains the dominant intellectual tradition in the West.
The latest tensions between the U.S. president and the military concerning the strategy of fighting against ISIS is a good illustration of how dominant the instrumental understanding of war still is. After delaying and some trepidation, president Obama in September 2014 announced the strategy against ISIS. dismissed an option of sending combat troops on the ground. 55 A few days after this speech the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff general M. Dempsey said that he may recommend deployment of American forces for combat operations in Iraq, if recent the strategy will fail to deliver some progress. 56 In the same week president Obama again confirmed his position of "no boots on the ground".
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Two months later the White House announced that the United States will send an additional 1.500 troops to Iraq, but was at pains to stress that it does not mean that soldiers will conduct combat operations. 58 A few days later general Dempsey said that he will consider sending soldiers to direct combat. Looking into this story and many others it becomes clear that debate about Clausewitz's I and VIII books is not some trivial academic discussion. If we emphasize book VIII we accept and grant a more independent role to the military domain. Actually, if we follow this interpretation we see war and policy as partners and their interaction is not a monologue, but a dialogue/ conversation. The aim of this dialogue is to create effective strategy. Strategy is an essential link connecting political goals with military means and ways. In order to find the balance between these elements you need well-considered strategy, which is difficult to create if you do not have constructive discussions between civilians and military.
It is worth recalling Feaver's words about the civilian's dilemma. People are afraid of the armed forces, which they created because wanted more security. In such sequence the need for security comes first and taming of the military second. It means that at first we have to concentrate on the issues of military preparedness and the ability to conduct operations. It is difficult if not entirely impossible to have an effective military without effective and constructive civil-military relations. Also from this perspective, civil-military relations first of all is about strategy. To formulate sound strategy is difficult if there is no proper understanding of the complex nature of war. 61 Both sides of the conversation should reflect and analyze events in their particular field and share insights. In this way, critical intellectual reflection is the essence of civilmilitary relations. However, to appreciate the full extent and importance of such reflections requires a new approach and model of civil-military control. The dominant models put emphasis on the institutional and legal dimension of these relationships. Yet, if we emphasize the importance of intellectual reflection then discussion about institutional framework becomes of secondary importance. The real power and object of civilian control are those who create, invent and distribute concepts, ideas and narratives. If you do not have a good conceptual apparatus, you will not have sound strategy.
Feaver's principal-agent theory illustrates this line of argument very well. According to this model, civil-military relations are a "game of strategic interaction". 62 During this game, civilians decide the best way to monitor the behavior of the military. At the same time, the military, after assessing the situation, decides to obey the given commands, or starts shirking from responsibility. You will have a crisis when civilians will monitor aggressively and force the military to shirk. 63 In order to conduct proper monitoring you need good defense journalists and scholars/pundits. That is a necessary, but not entirely sufficient condition. What is the use of monitoring if you are not capable of asking conceptual questions about the military's conceptual production. It is not enough to check and balance the institutional framework. You need to check the conceptual dimension too.
All this shows why the notion of infrastructural power is a useful one. It provides analytical tools to understand processes in the areas of the concepts and perceptions. Knowledge is a power and those who provide it and create it have control. 64 In other words, if military concepts and theories are created mainly by the military, then civilians will see and discuss war through "military discourse glasses". Moreover, military and friendly civilian experts can turn discussion into areas of technical details and issues, where they hold the upper hand and at the same time they can avoid political questions. In such a case, at first we will ask the question: how; but not why? 65 Therefore, we would not have sound and effective strategy if we would not encourage conceptual conversation/debate between civilians and the military. From the start, we should talk about reflection on two levels. At first, there should be a culture of reflection inside the armed forces. Officers should be encouraged to discuss issues of military theory or recent military experiences. After fulfilling this condition, we may start reflection in the second dimension, i.e. between civilians and military. Debates in this second dimension will help to employ discursive civilian control and it will provide necessary insights for the creation of sound strategy.
To establish and create the grounds for such an approach is difficult, because Western militaries are known to have very strong anti-intellectual traditions. The hostility to contemplative man in American, British, French and other militaries are well known. 66 Because war is a terrible, cruel phenomenon, you need practical skills, not conceptual ones. You need a man of action. 67 This means that there might be a low level of tolerance and acceptance of officers who take a keen interest in conceptual issues. R. Peters famously stated that "in the military context, theory is a killer". 68 In this context the British tradition of muddling through every time you have ad hoc solutions and keep doctrinal documents small as possible, is considered as a better option. 69 Therefore, it is important to emphasize that in Western militaries we have traditions living alongside each other. One is encouraging intellectual enquiry and reflection, while the second one is trying to eradicate "philosophy" from the military.
Summing up this part of the paper we may say that the mainstream civil-military relations theories follow the liberal interpretation of Clausewitz, i.e. war is subservient to politics. The Liberal tradition also emphasizes the principle of power separation and looks suspiciously at the armed forces. However, the first task and function for the military is waging war. Because of that, civil-military relations must provide conditions which permit the creation of sound strategy. Therefore, institutional civilian control is not enough. Intellectual reflection is an essential part of this process. It helps to pursue discursive control of the military.
Civil-Military Relations in Lithuania
After regaining independence, the Baltic states were in a unique situation. They had to create their armed forces from scratch. The only things left from the Soviet era were military barracks, infrastructure and soviet trained officers. All of the other necessary elements, like legal bases, institutions, structure of armed forces, and equipment had to be created following Western models.
To reign in the military sphere and take it under civilian control was a prerequisite in order to join the community of Western states, i.e. NATO and the EU. These processes were performed on two levels. First, the civilians saw control of the military as a part of larger, transition to democratic processes. 70 At the same time, growing and maturing officer corps started coping and emulating transnational military norms. According to T. Farrell, new and fresh military structures, when involved in international activities, are grouped according to two norms: the norm of conventional warfare and that of the superiority of civilian oversight. 71 In other words, if Lithuanian armed forces wanted an invitation and acceptance to international "military club", they had to learn and accept civilian control. However, all these have sideeffects. Following the idea of T. Skocpol, we should separate the processes of democratization and bureaucratization. 72 In the Lithuanian case, the transition to democracy happened first and the creation of institutions, especially military ones, followed later. That means that at first we establish the norm of civilian oversight and only later we create armed forces and all other related institutions. Therefore, the laws based on ideal type preceded real life activities and created tensions.
The establishment of civilian control was not an easy task. There was an accident during the summer in 1993, when a group of volunteers disobeyed orders of their superiors and went out of the barracks. With the help of some brinkmanship and negotiations the crises were over in a few months. However, it was a reminder that to control the military will not be easy. Some of the officers were keen to be active politically. 73 Going over the pages of the military journal Kardas (Saber) it easy to see the tensions that existed between some retired officers and minister of defense at that time, A. Butkevičius. 74 However, there were tensions and disagreements between retired interwar officers, officers who started commission in 1990-91 and soviet trained officers who joined Lithuanian armed forces. Later on, a new twist was added, when exodus officers, mainly from US, came back and joined the military. Overall, during the first decade of independence the atmosphere inside the armed forces and between civilians and military was tense. However, to have mature behavior from institutions and people, when everything was created from the scratch, was too much to ask.
In 2000, marking the ten-year anniversary of the Lithuanian defense system, it was clear that from an institutional-legal perspective Lithuania had a functioning democratic civilian military control. Since 1996 there was whole package of confirmed laws, regulating the life and functions of armed forces: Basic law of security (1996), Military service and organization law (1998), international operations and military exercise law (1998), military defence and resistance law (2000) . Also in 2000 the first national Military defense strategy was confirmed, where the principle of democratic civil military control was established as one of four fundamental principles of Lithuanian security architecture.
In Lithuania civil-military control was established based upon the Huntingtonian model, where the political and military domains are clearly divided. The mechanism permitting the establishment of despotic power in the hands of civilians was established. The first stage-the emulation and copying of Western institutional framework-was completed. The next stage, filling this framework with competent, daily implementation of these principles had begun.
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According to Western scholars, post-communist countries successfully copied the framework of civilian control; however, the contents of this control remained questionable. A. Cottey spoke about a second generation problematic. Constructive civil-military relations means not only well-functioning laws, competent civil servants and well trained soldiers. It is also necessary to talk about all these issues within wider society. However, these comments and recommendations by western scholars do not question basic assumptions, namely, that the military must not be admitted to the political sphere. The security of institutional, despotic power remains the essence of civil-military relations.
All of these remarks about the situation in post-communist states are unfair, because lots of the same problems exist in mature democratic countries too. The Western model of civil-military relations, which is used in these countries and which was recommended to Lithuania because of its institutionalcentric approach, creates obstacles to realize at a second, i.e. reflective, stage.
The unintended negative consequence of all of this is that the creation of the institutional-legal system of civilian control came at the price of a neglected intellectual reflection tradition. It does not mean that the creation of necessary institutions and confirmation of laws was not important. On the contrary, they are important elements of civilian control, but they are not the only ones. There are other sides to this picture. It is hardly Lithuania's fault, because we were given recommendations based on the best Western practices.
This diffusion of Western practices and ideas brought some confusion. It is important to emphasize that Huntington and Janowitz created their models and discussed about professionalization of officer corps based upon an already existing institutional framework. They took for granted the existing American and British traditions of military education, which provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an intellectual reflection tradition. This tradition coexisted with the aforementioned anti-intellectual tradition in the Western armed forces. This coexistence is best illustrated by the tradition of military journals. The US military has its Parameters, Military review, Joint Force Quarterly, Air and space power journal, Naval War College review; British RUSI journal, British army review; the Russians have Военная Мысль, etc. In these and similar journals, officers, civilian experts, and scholars share their insights, ideas and experience, and propose new ideas, concepts, and norms which help to create sound strategy. The pages of these journals saw the emergence of numerous strategic, operational and tactical level ideas, which, in due time, became part of the conceptual apparatus. It is a place where a colonel may have a constructive and fruitful debate with a general. Discussions in these journals also provide an opportunity to monitor, the kinds of ideas, themes and opinions that dominate in the military ranks and by doing that, it is possible to take effective control of military perception.
All of that to some extent existed when Huntington and Janowitz created their theories. When at least some of the officers take advantage of the possibility to critically reflect and review conceptual framework, then it is much easier to speak about separation or fusion of the political and the military domains. That is why, when Lithuania was creating its system by emulating Western practices, it gave poor attention to military education and all of that led to a poor quality of intellectual reflection.
Let's take a look at Lithuanian practice. At first glance it would seem that we also have a tradition of military journals. The ministry of defense funds the publishing of a handful of journals: Kardas, Karys, Kariūnas, Krašto apsauga. If we consider the Western practice as some ideal type, then in Lithuanian journals we should find papers and discussions about military thought, and analysis of the most recent military campaigns. However, when looking into the pages of these journals a feeling of disappointment takes hold. During the 25 years of independence, only a handful of articles about the conceptual issues of war have appeared in these journals. Even more challenging is finding 233 an article written not by a retired, but by an active duty officer. 76 It is important to emphasize that we are talking not about articles from a battalion's life or military exercise summary. For serious conceptual discussion, you need papers about principles and priorities of defense, declared in the state's main strategic documents, such as territorial defense, manueverist approach, transformation, urban warfare, etc. The publications of col. S. Knezys about the first Chechen war 77 , and the ideas about national security and territorial defense proposed by col. ltn. J. Užurka and his colleagues 78 , the discussion about informational war and leadership by A. Alonderis 79 , the tactical analysis about urban combat by mjr. A. Daugirdas 80 or the analysis of contemporary military operations and concepts by I. Miškinis 81 are those which we would consider proper analytical papers. However, despite original, interesting insights, when reading these articles it is not difficult to see that there is no chronological, thematic or conceptual consistency.
In the issues of Kardas and Karys you may find lots of articles about Lithuanian military past (wars of medieval ages), interwar wars for Independence, Resistance movement against the Soviet occupation, and also memoirs of retired officers and fighters. Yet it is difficult to find publications about the most recent Lithuanian military experience. Mostly it is some sketch writings, which hardly have any analytical insights. Of course, it would not be true to say that there are no interesting articles. The ones written by D. Sutkus come to mind. There the author is discussing the most recent trends in military practices and the experiences of foreign armed forces. Once again, however, it is important to emphasize that the author is a civilian and that active duty officers are not keen on writing for these journals.
The poor quality of contemporary military journals becomes clear when you compare it with the situation in interwar Lithuania. At that time the armed forces were publishing not only Kardas and Karys, but also a journal completely dedicated to military thought and military operations analysis -Mūsų žinynas. Even more importantly, the main authors of this journal were active duty officers. After regaining its independence Lithuania renewed publication of Kardas and Karys, but the question of Mūsų žinynas remained unresolved up till now. This entire story is symptomatic when talking about the situation of intellectual reflection in the contemporary Lithuanian armed forces.
Probably the only time when the question of this intellectual passivity of officers had been acknowledged publicly was in 1996, when the editorial board of Kardas challenged officers to write. The intention was to provoke military men to be more active, and to write and discuss military matters in the pages of this publication. 82 This challenge was most actively accepted by ltn. V. Voveris. He wrote that dominant themes in these publications were "reminiscences and memoirs, which were interesting only to the authors and their relatives". 83 According to him, what most officers want are articles about military thought, conduct of operations, etc. However, his comments and ideas met with fierce resistance and were rebuffed by retired officers and, in this way, the idea of "intellectual challenge" was dead. 84 The ability to discuss conceptual issues is well illustrated by a discussion about Lithuanian military doctrine. 85 Talks about the necessity to have its own military doctrine at various levels existed since the creation of the armed forces. However, the Lithuanian military achieved this goal only in 2010. 86 While reading various papers written by civilians and officers it becomes clear that nobody could provide a clear definition of the role of military doctrine. The most popular idea was that military doctrine must be synchronized with National security and Military strategies. What was lacking were questions about the contents of this doctrine, as well as military principles and concepts. The debate was compartmentalized and done along bureaucratic lines. 87 The development of the doctrine is a good illustration of the quality of Lithuanian military intellectual reflection. When you have the development of such an important document you expect serious discussions in military journals and other public outlets. Questions about the type of doctrine, its functions, and the experience(s) of other countries, operational principles and concepts should dominate the debate. However, in reality there were only a few sketchy articles. The first serious academic paper about the perception of doctrine in Lithuania was published in 2014. 88 In the end, we have a situation when Lithuanian military doctrine declares, "mission command is one of two fundamental warfare principles followed by Lithuanian armed forces". 89 This type of command in the document is defined as "flexible, pragmatic and decentralized implementation of given task". 90 It is clear that mission command there is understood institutionally: the commander provides and explains his intent and gives freedom of actions to his subordinates to achieve the desired goal. Such an understanding of the mission command has dominated in Lithuania since the first days of its introduction. 91 However, mission command is not only particular institutional solutions and decentralization of chain of command. It refers to a specific culture of military education and training. It is best known by its German name Auftragstaktik. This German military tradition was famous for its attention to the cultivation of the intellectual abilities of its officers. It required officers to regularly reflect about their profession, write to various journals, and participate in public debates. 92 Therefore, if we declare that mission command is one of the fundamental principles of warfare, it means that its full capabilities can be seen only when we have intellectually active officers.
Yet there was no great intellectual activity in Lithuanian military journals. Probably some people would say that the best place to look for such activity is serious academic journals like Lithuanian annual strategic review, or Baltic security and defence review. However, a review of these publications just confirms the already familiar picture. Active officers are not publishing in these journals.
Moreover, it is difficult even to find an article about military thought, or even concepts written by civilian scholars. For instance, during its 13 years of publishing, the Lithuanian annual strategic review published only 2 articles written by officers. 93 The Baltic defence review since 1999 has published 6 articles (most of them are compilations of facts and data) written by the officers, and from these only the paper of A. Litvaitis is a proper academic publication. 94 Looking at these numbers raises concerns about why officers are so passive. According to the numbers provided by the MoD, between 1992 and 2001 in various foreign military colleges and academies 2685 Lithuanian officers attended classes and courses. 95 The official position in the Lithuanian armed forces is that an officer seeking higher rank must get a proper academic degree and finish different courses in Lithuanian and foreign military academies. 96 This means that most officers spend part of their service in classrooms debating military concepts and analyzing the history of military conflicts. These academic sabbatical holidays provide the opportunity to concentrate on intellectual reflection about war and warfare. Also, as a rule, such studies in these courses are finished by writing papers, essays. Therefore, the question is thus raised as to why officers do not publish these essays in journals, as their colleagues in Western countries routinely do.
Moving from the articles to the books it is hard to see any differences. In 2005 the Lithuanian military academy published Professional military, in which 3 officers published their papers. 97 Another book worth mentioning is S. Knezys' Chechen war. The author of this book was high-ranking officer when it was published. In this book the author provides a highly detailed tactical and operational analysis of the war. 98 The didactic intention of the book is clear from the start. At that time in Lithuania there was an ongoing debate about territorial defense and the Chechen war provided a lot of valuable insights. However, younger officers did not follow this example and have not written books on similar issues.
This poor state of reflection is even starker when again we compare our times with the interwar period. In 1994 some enthusiast republished a book written in the late 1930's by staff officer mjr. V. Bulvičius' book "Military Education of the State". 99 In his book the major provides insightful analysis and critique of the mainstream military theory. The quality of this work is so high that it is still unsurpassed in the Lithuanian context. It is sad to conclude that in the 25 years since regaining independence no civilian or military man has managed to write a book on military issues which could challenge the quality of this publication, written almost 70 years ago.
Overall, it is clear that the Lithuanian military did not spend much time writing, debating and disseminating military ideas and concepts. Because of this we have a complicated situation. With such passivity, doubts about military competencies arise. What do officers know about contemporary military theory and the changing character of war? The lack of such activities creates many challenges for civilians. If you cannot understand military mentality, or the perception of war, how can you pursue effective civilian control of the military? Such passivity in intellectual reflection leads to an intellectual and conceptual gap between civilians and soldiers. 100 During many conversations with MoD officials and high-ranking officers it became clear that officially there are no restrictions for the officers to publish papers. However, some middle ranking officers said that this passivity is a result of a scandal, which, in winter 2002, embroiled then Chief of Defence gen. mjr. J. Kronkaitis. Participating in a conference in California, the general made some remarks about the political situation back in Lithuania. Politicians criticized the general that he became too political. 101 Younger officers drew simple conclusions from this story: if you want keep your job, do not stick your neck out in any way.
are more deeply analyzed in only 7 or 8 articles, in which general Western trends are discussed. 106 Considering all this, it might be said that the poor condition of the military's intellectual reflection is a mirror image of the situation on the civilian side. It is difficult to require from officers analytical papers when there are only a few journalists and scholars writing on this subject. Therefore, it is difficult to control the military conceptually because civilian expertise is also quite shallow.
The 2014 events in Ukraine laid bare all these deficiencies. Suddenly military issues dominated the headlines. Everywhere you could see headlines about hybrid and informational warfare, polite little green men, defense budget, and procurement politics. It was obvious that the military was uncomfortable with such sudden popularity. For them it was hard to accept that civilians have a right to ask questions about issues that one year ago were considered exclusively soldiers' business. In other words, the military was not happy with this kind of control, which in many ways was conceptual. Wider society wanted to know how and in what ways the military is preparing to defend Lithuania.
In the future 2014 probably will be seen as a breakthrough year in military studies in Lithuania. That year saw the publication of 3 books, which might be a game changer. The first one is written by defense journalist A. Matonis and is about the history of Lithuanian special operations forces. 107 The mere fact that MoD gave him permission to write this book using official material, making interviews with soldiers serving in the SOF, is in itself a clear sign of changing attitudes.
The second publication is about all of the conflicts that have happened in Lithuanian territory since 1816. The team of prominent military historians and social scientists analyzed and systemized historical data in order to revise and supplement major academic database on wars -Correlates of War. 108 Du-ring the writing, scholars found some deficiencies in the methodology of this database and it led to an international academic debate. 109 Finally, the third book is about interwar Lithuanian military power. It is the first systemic, well-thought and well-researched publication about Lithuanian military planning and doctrines. 110 However, this qualitative step during the last years cannot compensate for the poor performance of the first 24 years of independence. A small number of civilian experts create obstacles to follow the military's work and checking it at a conceptual level. The concepts used by the military were not scrutinized and it led to a situation in which public discourse dominates narratives provided by the military. If we consider a sound strategy as a result of effective civil-military relations, which itself is a result of existing traditions of intellectual reflection, then it means that Lithuanian civil-military relations have serious problems. From what has been stated here it seems that only recently serious steps are taken to correct these deficiencies.
Conclusion
Civil-military relations and civilian control refers not only to a particular legal system, bureaucratic apparatus and exclusion of military from politics. Equally important is the content of processes happening under these conditions. The main function of the armed forces is to defend the homeland. In order to do that it is necessary to have sound strategy. Formulation of such strategy requires the realization of two conditions. First, members of the military should be treated as partners in the discussion, not as servants. Second, a high quality discussion about military issues and discursive control of military can exist only by encouraging the intellectual tradition. An officer who is incompetent and does not know how to analyze and discuss about the latest military trends might provide misleading recommendations. Politicians and wider society, often ignorant in military issues, may not be able to understand whether the recommendations provided by the military are reliable or not.
